大型水利水电工程实施过程中，索赔事件时有发生。相对于索赔经验丰富的承包商而言，业主方的索赔管理水平要落后很多。应用博弈论的基本原理，探讨大型水利水电工程业主如何进行索赔管理的问题，具有独特的优势。针对业主与承包商在获得索赔信息方面具有信息不对称性，利用建立的业主索赔管理不对称信息动态博弈模型，分别讨论了当存在索赔欺诈时，业主进行索赔管理与不进行索赔管理两种策略下行为选择的最优解。结果表明，行业的整体规范程度及项目索赔发生率将直接影响业主是否考虑进行科学的索赔管理，业主的策略选择反过来能够有效地制约承包商在索赔过程中的欺诈行为，对欺诈索赔事件的罚金f的合理取值也能极大程度地抑制承包商在建设过程中的索赔欺诈。

Claim events always happen during the implementation process of large hydraulic and hydroelectric engineering. Compared with the contractor with rich claiming experiences, the claiming management level of the owner falls behind. The game theory has a unique advantage in the discussion of how the owner of the large hydraulic and hydroelectric engineering performs the claiming management. Due to that the owner and contractor have obtained the asymmetric claiming information, the asymmetric information dynamic game model of the claiming management of the owner is developed to investigate the optimal solution of the behavior options under two strategies with and without claiming management by the owner when claiming fraud exists. The results indicate that the overall standard of the industry and claiming rate can affect the decision made by the owner of whether to make claiming management. On the other hand, the strategy selection of the owner can restrict the fraud claiming of the contractor. Moreover, a reasonable value of the fraud claiming fine “f” can reduce the occurrence of the fraud claiming.