针对调水工程受水区用水户使用外调水意愿不足，存在过度开采当地地下水或超量使用地表水等违规取用水行为的情况，基于社会共治理念，考虑引入社会公众监督力量，借助演化博弈理论，通过建立地方政府、用水户与社会公众的三方演化博弈模型，探讨不同情况下地方政府、用水户与社会公众的演化稳定策略以及实现系统稳定的条件，并通过系统动力学仿真分析研究模型中关键参数对三方利益主体演化策略的影响。结果表明：政府监管成本、补贴力度、处罚力度、违规取用水行为监管发现率以及社会公众监督举报成本是影响三方演化博弈的关键因素。其中，降低政府监管成本能够显著提升政府监管力度；提升政府水费补贴和惩罚力度能够促进用水户选择使用外调水，相较于政府处罚力度，用水户对于政府补贴力度更加敏感；降低监督举报成本能够提升社会公众参与监督的意愿。为此，建议政府从优化监管机制和措施、完善取用水奖惩制度与引导公众广泛参与3个方面推进调水工程受水区外调水的消纳与本地水的合规取用。

The local water price of the South-to-North Water Transfers Project was comparatively higher in some receiving areas. Driven by economic interests, the water users tended to illegally over-exploit the scarce local water resources, leading to a series of ecological and environmental problems in these regions. It is necessary to study the regulatory mechanisms of water use behavior under the dual constraints of government regulation and public supervision in order to reduce the illegal water use behavior in receiving areas. The research took local governments, water users, and the public as three main participants. An evolutionary game model was established to explore the strategic choices of the participants under different scenarios. A system dynamics model was constructed for simulating the evolution of strategies in the three-party game system and the impact of key parameters on the behavior strategies of the participants. The results showed that: (1) government regulation is affected by the cost of regulation, but only when the cost of strict regulation is controlled within a specific acceptable range could the government be more active in adopting the strategy of strict regulation. (2) Increasing government water fee subsidies and penalties could encourage users to choose external water. Water users were more sensitive to government subsidies than to penalties. (3) Supervision cost was a crucial factor influencing public participation in supervision and reporting. High supervision costs would lead the public to abandon participation in supervision and reporting. It is concluded that the government played a guiding and constraining role in the water use behavior. It was necessary to establish reasonable and effective regulatory and punitive mechanisms to reduce illegal water use while providing appropriate water use subsidies to increase the willingness of water users to use external water. Additionally, as an essential supplement to the government's regulatory power, the public requires an incentive mechanism to enhance their participation in supervision and reporting. Relevant policy recommendations were proposed for reducing illegal water use behavior by improving government regulatory mechanisms and methods, perfecting effective punitive systems, and promoting public supervision.