针对调水工程受水区用水户使用外调水意愿不足，存在过度开采当地地下水或超量使用地表水等违规取用水行为的情况。基于社会共治理念，考虑引入社会公众监督力量，借助演化博弈理论，通过建立地方政府、用水户与社会公众的三方演化博弈模型，探讨不同情况下地方政府、用水户与社会公众的演化稳定策略以及实现系统稳定的条件，并通过系统动力学仿真分析研究模型中关键参数对三方利益主体演化策略的影响。结果表明：政府监管成本、补贴力度、处罚力度、违规取用水行为监管发现率以及社会公众监督举报成本是影响三方演化博弈的关键因素。降低政府监管成本能够显著提升政府监管力度；提升政府水费补贴和惩罚力度能够促进用水户选择使用外调水，相较于政府处罚力度，用水户对于政府补贴力度更加敏感；降低监督举报成本能够提升社会公众参与监督的意愿。为此，建议政府从优化监管机制和措施、完善取用水奖惩制度与引导公众广泛参与三个方面推进调水工程受水区外调水的消纳与本地水的合规取用。

Aiming at the situation that water users in the receiving area of the water transfer project have insufficient willingness to use the transferred water, and there are violations of water use behaviours such as over-exploitation of groundwater or over-use of surface water. In this paper, we consider introducing the power of the public on the basis of the government"s individual regulation mode, take the local government, water users and the public as the research object, establish a three-party evolutionary game model, and simulate the system dynamics model to study the evolution process of the strategy of the three-party game system and the influence of the main parameters on the behavioural strategy of the participating subjects. The results show that: the cost difference between strict and lax government regulation affects the choice of government regulatory strategy, and a reasonable regulatory cost difference can enhance the government"s willingness to adopt a strict regulatory strategy; the government"s tendency to increase the subsidy of water tariffs and increase the punishment can promote the tendency of water users to choose to use transferred water, and the water users are more sensitive to the government"s subsidy than the government"s punishment; the cost of supervision is inversely proportional to the willingness of public participation in supervision and reporting. The cost of monitoring is inversely proportional to the willingness of the public to participate in monitoring and reporting, and the public will give up participating in monitoring and reporting after the cost of monitoring reaches a critical value. Policy recommendations are made to reduce water use violations by water users in terms of improving the government"s regulatory mechanism and methods, improving the effective penalty system, and promoting public monitoring.

国家自然科学基金面上项目(42371312)；国家社会科学基金后期资助项目(19FJYB029)