Research on Claiming Management of Owner for Large Hydraulic and Hydroelectric Engineering with Asymmetric Information
Article
Figures
Metrics
Preview PDF
Reference
Related
Cited by
Materials
Abstract:
Claim events always happen during the implementation process of large hydraulic and hydroelectric engineering. Compared with the contractor with rich claiming experiences, the claiming management level of the owner falls behind. The game theory has a unique advantage in the discussion of how the owner of the large hydraulic and hydroelectric engineering performs the claiming management. Due to that the owner and contractor have obtained the asymmetric claiming information, the asymmetric information dynamic game model of the claiming management of the owner is developed to investigate the optimal solution of the behavior options under two strategies with and without claiming management by the owner when claiming fraud exists. The results indicate that the overall standard of the industry and claiming rate can affect the decision made by the owner of whether to make claiming management. On the other hand, the strategy selection of the owner can restrict the fraud claiming of the contractor. Moreover, a reasonable value of the fraud claiming fine “f” can reduce the occurrence of the fraud claiming.